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ERENCE CUNEO AND RUSS SHAFER-LANDAU have re-
cently proposed a new version of moral nonnaturalism, according 
to which there are nonnatural moral concepts and truths but no 
nonnatural moral facts.1 This view entails that moral error theorists are 
conceptually deficient. We explain why moral error theorists are not con-
ceptually deficient. We then argue that this explanation reveals what is 
wrong with Cuneo and Shafer-Landau’s view. 
 
1. Cuneo and Shafer-Landau’s New Version of Moral Nonnatural-
ism  
 
Consider the following propositions: 
 
(1) It is wrong to engage in the recreational slaughter of a fellow person.2 
(2) It is morally admirable to express gratitude to a benefactor whose gift re-
sulted  from substantial sacrifice undertaken from exclusively altruistic 
motives. 
(3) There is some moral reason to offer aid to those in distress, if such aid is 
very easily given and comes at very little expense. 
 
According to Cuneo and Shafer-Landau, propositions like (1), (2) and (3) 
have “framework status, fixing the boundaries as to what counts as a type 
of subject matter”: a normative system that fails to incorporate these 
propositions is not a moral system, but is instead a normative system of 
some other kind.3 They therefore take propositions like (1), (2) and (3) to 
be conceptual truths, which they call “the moral fixed points.”4 
Cuneo and Shafer-Landau think that conceptual truths are made true 
by the essences of their constituent concepts. If so, the proposition that 
 
(4) Unmarried men are bachelors 
 
is made true by the essences of the concepts UNMARRIED MAN and 
BACHELOR: the essences of these concepts are such that anything that 
satisfies the concept UNMARRIED MAN thereby satisfies the concept 
 
                                                
1 Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (2014). Cuneo and Shafer-Landau argue that nonnaturalists 
can also say that there are nonnatural moral facts, but they take this to be an optional 
addition to their version of nonnaturalism. We will ignore this optional addition, since it 
does not affect our arguments. 
2 Like Cuneo and Shafer-Landau, we use the term “wrong” to mean pro tanto wrong. 
3 Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (2014: 407). 
4 They also give three other reasons for taking the moral fixed points to be conceptual 
truths: that if these propositions are true, they are necessarily true; that if they are know-
able, they are knowable a priori; and that denying them tends to evoke “bewilderment” 
(2014: 407-8). We return to this in n. 9. 
T 
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BACHELOR. Similarly, Cuneo and Shafer-Landau think, the proposition 
that 
 
(1) It is wrong to engage in the recreational slaughter of a fellow person 
 
is made true by the essences of the concepts RECREATIONAL SLAUGHTER 
OF A FELLOW PERSON and WRONG: the essences of these concepts are 
such that anything that satisfies the concept RECREATIONAL SLAUGHTER 
OF A FELLOW PERSON thereby satisfies the concept WRONG.  
Cuneo and Shafer-Landau take moral concepts like WRONG to be 
nonnatural concepts, in the sense that these concepts are not equivalent 
to any natural concept. They therefore think that nonnaturalists need not 
say that propositions like (1), (2) and (3) are made true by nonnatural 
facts, but can instead say that such propositions are made true, in part, by 
nonnatural concepts. 
 (1), (2) and (3) are general moral propositions. What about particular 
moral propositions? Suppose that Fred is engaging in the recreational 
slaughter of a fellow person. In that case, Cuneo and Shafer-Landau 
think, the true proposition that 
 
(1) It is wrong to engage in the recreational slaughter of a fellow person 
 
and the true proposition that 
 
(5) Fred is engaging in the recreational slaughter of a fellow person 
 
together make it true that 
 
(6) Fred’s action is wrong. 
 
Since (1) and (5) together make (6) true, Cuneo and Shafer-Landau think 
that (6) is made true by the essences of (1)’s constituent concepts, one of 
which is a nonnatural concept, together with the natural fact that makes 
(5) true. They therefore think that nonnaturalists need not say that partic-
ular moral propositions like (6) are made true by nonnatural facts either. 
Almost all philosophers agree that moral concepts like WRONG are 
nonnatural concepts, in the sense that these concepts are not equivalent 
to any natural concept.5 Standard nonnaturalism is controversial not be-
cause it says that there are nonnatural moral concepts in this sense, but be-
cause it says that there are nonnatural moral facts. Since Cuneo and Shaf-
er-Landau’s version of nonnaturalism avoids this controversial commit-
ment, it may seem more attractive than standard nonnaturalism. 
 
 
                                                
 5 Though, as Cuneo and Shafer-Landau note, Jackson (1998) denies this. So does Finlay 
(2014). 
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2. Why the Moral Fixed Points Are Not Conceptual Truths 
 
Cuneo and Shafer-Landau’s view avoids a commitment to nonnatural 
facts by taking on a different controversial commitment instead – namely, 
by saying that (1), (2), (3) and the other moral fixed points are conceptual 
truths. According to Cuneo and Shafer-Landau, anyone who denies these 
propositions is “conceptually deficient”: such a person either lacks moral 
concepts or fails to see that the essences of these concepts make proposi-
tions like (1), (2) and (3) true.6 Since moral error theorists deny that any-
thing is wrong, morally admirable or a moral reason, they deny that (1), 
(2) and (3) are true.7 Cuneo and Shafer-Landau’s view therefore entails 
that moral error theorists are conceptually deficient.8 
Are Cuneo and Shafer-Landau right that (1), (2), (3) and the other 
moral fixed points are conceptual truths? Consider a different concept: 
the concept GOD. Suppose that a Christian thinks that 
 
(7) Benevolence is rewarded by God. 
 
This Christian may think that (7) has what Cuneo and Shafer-Landau call 
“framework status”: he or she may think that a faith that fails to incorpo-
rate (7) is not a form of Christianity, but is instead a faith of some other 
kind. Just as Cuneo and Shafer-Landau take (1), (2) and (3)’s framework 
status to show that (1), (2) and (3) are conceptual truths, this Christian 
may take (7)’s framework status to show that (7) is a conceptual truth. 
And if this Christian endorses Cuneo and Shafer-Landau’s view that con-
ceptual truths are made true by the essences of their constituent concepts, 
he or she will think that (7) is made true by the essences of the concepts 
BENEVOLENCE and REWARDED BY GOD: he or she will think that the es-
sence of these concepts is such that anything that satisfies the concept 
BENEVOLENCE thereby satisfies the concept REWARDED BY GOD. 
But, of course, (7) is not a conceptual truth. For it is not a conceptu-
al truth that God exists, and if God does not exist, something that satis-
fies the concept BENEVOLENCE does not thereby satisfy the concept 
REWARDED BY GOD. The essences of these concepts therefore do not 
 
                                                
6 This person may fail to see this either because he or she has what Cuneo and Shafer-
Landau call an “inadequate” or “confused” grasp of these concepts, of because he or 
she “fails to appreciate or acknowledge the manifest implications” of these concepts 
(2014: 413). 
7 For defenses of a moral error theory, see Mackie (1977), Joyce (2001), Streumer (2013) 
and Olson (2014). 
8 As Ingram (2015) argues, this implication by itself throws doubt on Cuneo and Shafer-
Landau’s view. One of us has defended an error theory about all normative judgements 
and has argued that we cannot believe this error theory, which means that he himself 
does not believe this theory either (Streumer 2013). But since this error theory implies 
that (1), (2) and (3) are false, Cuneo and Shafer-Landau will presumably say that this 
theory is conceptually false, and that its defender is therefore conceptually deficient. 
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make (7) conceptually true, but at most make it conceptually true that 
 
(7*) If anything is rewarded by God, benevolence is rewarded by God. 
 
Similar claims apply to (1), (2) and (3). It is not a conceptual truth that 
wrongness is instantiated, and if wrongness is not instantiated, something 
that satisfies the concept RECREATIONAL SLAUGHTER OF A FELLOW 
PERSON does not thereby satisfy the concept WRONG. The essences of 
these concepts therefore do not make (1) conceptually true, but at most 
make it conceptually true that 
 
 (1*) If anything is wrong, it is wrong to engage in the recreational slaughter of a 
fellow person. 
 
Similarly, the essences of (2) and (3)’s constituent concepts do not make 
(2) and (3) conceptually true, but at most make it conceptually true that 
 
(2*) If anything is morally admirable, it is morally admirable to express gratitude to 
a benefactor whose gift resulted from substantial sacrifice undertaken 




(3*) If anything is a moral reason, there is some moral reason to offer aid to those 
in distress that is very easily given and comes at very little expense. 
 
Cuneo and Shafer-Landau may be right that (1), (2) and (3) have “frame-
work status”: they may be right that a normative system that fails to in-
corporate (1), (2) and (3) is not a moral system. But this only shows that it 
is conceptually true that if anything satisfies the constituent moral concepts of (1), 
(2) and (3), then (1) (2) and (3) are true. In other words, it only shows that 
(1*), (2*) and (3*) are conceptually true. Since (1*), (2*) and (3*) do not 
say or entail that anything is in fact wrong, morally admirable or a moral 
reason, moral error theorists can accept (1*), (2*) and (3*).9 If (1*), (2*) 
and (3*) are conceptual truths, it therefore does not follow that moral 
error theorists are conceptually deficient.10 
 
                                                
9 Moreover, moral error theorists can also agree with Cuneo and Shafer-Landau that if 
(1), (2) and (3) are true, they are necessarily true (while denying that (1), (2) and (3) are in 
fact true); they can agree that if (1), (2) and (3) are knowable, they are knowable a priori 
(while denying that (1), (2) and (3) are in fact knowable); and they can agree that denying 
(1), (2) and (3) tends to evoke bewilderment (while saying that such denials tend to 
evoke bewilderment not because (1), (2) and (3) are conceptual truths, but because a 
moral error theory is, as Olson (2014: 143), puts it, “emotionally difficult to accept”). 
10 Cuneo and Shafer-Landau also say that when moral error theorists reject “highly evi-
dent first-order moral propositions such as that it is wrong to engage in recreational 
slaughter of a fellow person” by appealing to “highly controversial metaethical claims 
such as [the claim that] there are no categorical reasons,” they are employing a “prob-
 
JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY | DISCUSSION NOTE 
ARE THE MORAL FIXED POINTS CONCEPTUAL TRUTHS? 
Daan Evers and Bart Streumer 
 
5 
Cuneo and Shafer-Landau could reply that if (1) has to be revised to 
(1*) to turn it into a conceptual truth, it is hard to see why the proposi-
tion that 
 
(4) Unmarried men are bachelors 
 
does not similarly have to be revised to 
 
(4*) If anything is a bachelor, unmarried men are bachelors 
 
to turn it into a conceptual truth. But (4) clearly does not have to be re-
vised to (4*) to turn it into a conceptual truth. So why, Cuneo and Shafer-
Landau could ask, should we think that (1) has to be revised to (1*) to 
turn it into a conceptual truth? 
The answer is that since the concept BACHELOR is identical to the 
concept UNMARRIED MAN, the satisfaction of the concept BACHELOR 
does not require more of the world than the satisfaction of the concept 
UNMARRIED MAN does. That is why (4) does not have to be revised to 
(4*) to turn it into a conceptual truth. By contrast, the satisfaction of the 
concept REWARDED BY GOD requires something of the world that the 
satisfaction of the concept BENEVOLENCE does not – namely, the exist-
ence of God. That is why (7) has to be revised to (7*) to turn it into a 
conceptual truth. Similarly, the satisfaction of the concept WRONG also 
requires something of the world that the satisfaction of the concept 
RECREATIONAL SLAUGHTER OF A FELLOW PERSON does not – namely, the 
instantiation of wrongness. That is why (1) also has to be revised to (1*) 
to turn it into a conceptual truth. 
Cuneo and Shafer-Landau could reply that, whereas the world has to 
be a certain way for God to exist, the world does not have to be a certain 
way for wrongness to be instantiated, at least not over and above contain-
ing recreational slaughter or instantiations of other natural properties that 
make actions satisfy the concept WRONG. If they reject our parallel be-
tween (7) and (1) in this way, they can agree that (7) has to be revised to 
(7*) to turn it into a conceptual truth, but deny that (1) similarly has to be 
revised to (1*) to turn it into a conceptual truth. 
But if Cuneo and Shafer-Landau say this, that will make their view 
much less attractive to their fellow nonnaturalists. For consider an anti-
moralist who lacks the concept WRONG and instead has the concept 
WRONGanti. Imagine that this concept plays the same role in this anti-
moralist’s thought and action as the concept WRONG does in ours: the 
judgment that an action is wronganti tends to motivate the anti-moralist to 
avoid this action, the anti-moralist tends to blame people for disregarding 
wrongnessanti and so on. This anti-moralist may take it to be a conceptual 
 
                                                
lematic” methodology (2014: 438). For a response to this charge, see Ingram (2015).  
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 (9) It is wronganti to stop people from engaging in the recreational slaughter of 
a fellow person. 
 
Of course, we want to say that the concept that should guide people’s 
behavior is WRONG rather than WRONGanti. But the anti-moralist can simi-
larly say that the concept that shouldanti guide people’s behavior is 
WRONGanti rather than WRONG. We may want to accuse the anti-moralist 
of being irrational. But the anti-moralist can similarly accuse us of being 
irrationalanti – and so on for any other normative concept.11 
Standard nonnaturalists think that something breaks this deadlock: 
they think that concepts like WRONG, SHOULD and IRRATIONAL ascribe 
properties that are really instantiated, whereas concepts like WRONGanti, 
SHOULDanti and IRRATIONALanti ascribe properties that are not really instan-
tiated.12 They can admit that it is a conceptual truth that 
 
(9*) If anything is wronganti, it is wronganti to stop people from engaging in the rec-
reational slaughter of a fellow person. 
 
But since they think that nothing is wronganti, they deny that (9) is true. By 
contrast, if Cuneo and Shafer-Landau say that the world does not have to 
be a certain way for wrongness to be instantiated over and above contain-
ing instantiations of natural properties that make actions satisfy the con-
cept WRONG, it is hard to see how they can avoid admitting that (9) is a 
conceptual truth. For if all that is required for the instantiation of wrong-
ness is the existence of the concept WRONG and the instantiation of natu-
ral properties that make actions satisfy this concept, all that is required 
for the instantiation of wrongnessanti similarly seems to be the existence of 
the concept WRONGanti and the instantiation of natural properties that 
make actions satisfy that concept. If Cuneo and Shafer-Landau say this, 
therefore, their view no longer seems to be a form of realism. That will 
undermine its attractiveness to their fellow nonnaturalists.13 
 
 
                                                
 11 And also for truth if we accept a deflationary account of the truth of normative 
propositions. 
 12 Of course, that standard nonnaturalists think this does not mean that it is true. Error 
theorists think it is false: they think that concepts like WRONG, SHOULD and IRRATIONAL 
also ascribe properties that are not instantiated. 
 13 This point is similar to the objections from “shmeasons” and “counter-reasons” that 
McPherson (2011) and Enoch (2011) make to quietism. That is no coincidence: if Cu-
neo and Shafer-Landau deny that the world has to be a certain way for wrongness to 
exist, their view comes close to being a version of quietism. 
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3. Why It Matters Whether the Moral Fixed Points Are Conceptual 
Truths 
 
Cuneo and Shafer-Landau may now agree that (1), (2) and (3) are not 
conceptual truths and that moral error theorists are therefore not concep-
tually deficient. But they may say that this does not matter, since they did 
not aim to refute the moral error theory but merely to convert other real-
ists to their new version of nonnaturalism. 
But if (1), (2) and (3) are not conceptual truths, this does undermine 
Cuneo and Shafer-Landau’s view. For if it is not a conceptual truth that 
 
(1) It is wrong to engage in the recreational slaughter of a fellow person 
 
then nonnaturalists cannot say that (1) is made true by the essences of the 
concepts RECREATIONAL SLAUGHTER OF A FELLOW PERSON and WRONG: 
they cannot say that the essences of these concepts are such that anything 
that satisfies the concept RECREATIONAL SLAUGHTER OF A FELLOW 
PERSON thereby satisfies the concept WRONG. Instead, unless more is 
said, they will have to say that claims like (1), (2) and (3) are made true by 
nonnatural moral facts. In other words, they will have to revert to stand-
ard nonnaturalism about general moral propositions. 
And suppose again that Fred is engaging in the recreational slaughter 
of a fellow person. The true proposition that 
 
(1*) If anything is wrong, it is wrong to engage in the recreational slaughter of 
a fellow person 
 
and the true proposition that 
 
(5) Fred’s action is the recreational slaughter of a fellow person 
 
do not together make it true that 
 
(6) Fred’s action is wrong. 
 
This means that if (1) is not a conceptual truth, nonnaturalists cannot say 
that a particular moral proposition like (6) is made true by the essences of 
(1)’s constituent concepts together with the natural fact that makes (5) 
true. Instead, unless more is said, they will have to say that (6) is, at least 
in part, made true by a nonnatural fact: either by a particular nonnatural 
fact or by a natural fact together with the more general nonnatural fact 
that makes (1) true. In other words, they will have to revert to standard 
nonnaturalism about particular moral propositions as well. 
We therefore conclude that Cuneo and Shafer-Landau’s defense of 
their new version of nonnaturalism fails. Since the moral fixed points are 
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not conceptual truths, moral nonnaturalists cannot avoid being commit-
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14 We are grateful to Terence Cuneo, Niels van Miltenburg and several anonymous ref-
erees for helpful comments. 
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